COMMENTS
THE PATENT PRACTITIONER ATTAINS MAJORITY:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT RULE AS
THEY PERTAIN TO THE PATENT
ATTORNEY AND AGENT
The public interest is not an absolute unyielding mandate, but
rather a discretionary function of the Court to be weighed along
with other factors in determining the applicability of the privilege
and the "work product" rule.'
We cannot conclude... that the proper application of work product [rule] and attorney-client privilege will be detrimental to the
public interest or offend paramount federal patent policy whenever
a patent solicitation is involved. 2
INTRODUCTION

The use of the attorney-client privilege and work product rule to
shield certain confidential information from discovery during litigation is a well-established practice in the law. 3 While general practitioners have long had available these exclusionary mechanisms, some attor4
neys, particularly those involved in patent matters, have, until recently,
5
6
been denied their protection. The purpose of this paper is to explore
1 Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315, 154 U.S.P.Q. 230, 234 (N.D. Okla. 1967).
2 Natta v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 410 F.2d 187, 190, 161 U.S.P.Q. 389, 391

(3d Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted).
3 See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1967)
(documents prepared by nonparty attorney in prior litigation were protected from discovery
under both the attorney-client privilege and work product rule); CAB v. Air Transport
Ass'n of America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (attorney-client privilege may be asserted
by a trade association in a proceeding before the CAB where requirements of privilege are
met).
4 See, e.g., Natta v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 410 F.2d 187, 161 U.S.P.Q. 389
(3d Cir. 1969); Shaffer Tool Works v. Joy Mfg. Co., 167 U.S.P.Q. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970);
In re Natta, 48 F.R.D. 319, 163 U.S.P.Q. 680 (D. Del. 1969).
5 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 101 U.S.
P.Q. 316 (D. Del. 1954); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85
U.S.P.Q. 5 (D. Mass. 1950).
6 This paper is directed to those with some special knowledge of patents and practice
before the United States Patent Office. The following brief overview is presented to
illustrate some of the general considerations involved in the practice of soliciting patents
for those unfamiliar with this specialized area of the law.
The United States patent laws reward not the first person to file a patent application,
as is common in many foreign countries, but rather the first inventor. The inventing
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the rationale of the courts in excluding patent practitioners from the
protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege and the work prodprocess is comprised of the acts of conception and reduction to practice. Great emphasis
is, therefore, placed upon determining when and by whom an invention has been made.
After the invention has been reduced to practice and if it appears that the invention
has both technological merit and corporate utility, a novelty study will be conducted. A
novelty study involves searching for and examining pertinent patents and technical literature in order to determine what, if any, feature of the invention is patentably novel. This
search and examination process may be done by in-house corporate patent attorneys or
agents, but is most often done by outside searching services.
Once the results of the search are at hand, the patent attorney or agent will review
the results and render a legal judgment as to whether the invention is patentable under
the patent statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 et seq. (1971). This statute requires not only that the
invention have utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1971), and be novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1971), but
also that the subject-matter be non-obvious in view of the prior art, 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1971). If the invention is judged to be unpatentable, no application for a patent will be
filed. However, if the invention is deemed to be patentable, the patent attorney or agent
weighing the technical and the business aspects of the invention determines whether the
novelty and commercial potential of the invention merit the filing of a patent application.
A patent application is not only a technical document, but is also a legal document
which describes the invention and sets out by formal claims the essence of the invention.
Standards for the contents of an application are set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1971) which
in pertinent part provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
In the United States, patent applications are examined in the Patent Office to determine if they meet the legal requirements of patentability. Upon receiving the application,
the examiner assigned to the application makes another independent search of the prior
art. If he finds that the invention as described by the claims is taught by a prior art
reference, he will reject the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1971); if he finds the invention
as claimed is obvious in view of one or more references, then he will reject the claims on
the basis of 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1971).
The applicant's patent attorney or agent then attempts to overcome these rejections
by raising legal arguments which assert, in part, that the statutory requirements of 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (1971) have, in fact, been met. In the alternative, he may also amend
the rejected claims so that they do not read upon the prior art.
The examiner then reexamines the amended application to determine if the applicant's claims are allowable. If they are, the application is passed to issue. If not, the claims
are finally rejected and the applicant is faced with the decision of whether to appeal the
examiner's decision or abandon the application. If a final rejection of the application is
entered by the examiner, the applicant has a right to appeal the decision to the Patent
Office Board of Appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1971). Should the applicant decide to appeal,
an appeal brief, propounding the legal arguments, is submitted to the Board for consideration. If an unfavorable decision is rendered by the Board, a further appeal may be
perfected to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 35 U.S.C.
§ 145 (1971) or to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) under

35 U.S.C. § 144 (1971).
The examination procedure is kept confidential within the Patent Office and the
records are not open to the public until such time as the patent has issued. 35 U.S.C. § 122
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uct rule and to analyze the current trends in this area in each of the
federal circuits.
The attorney-client privilege first arose in the English law during
the reign of Elizabeth I and was premised on a theory quite different
from that usually invoked today. 7 The original theory was objective
and based on "a consideration for the oath and the honor of the attorney
rather than for the apprehensions of his client. . . 'The first duty of
an attorney,' it has been said, 'is to keep the secrets of his clients.' ",8
Gradually, however, a new theory developed which
looked to the necessity of providing subjectively for the client's
freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser.9

In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by
clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal
(1971), 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (1971), and 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1972). Should the application become
abandoned, it is retained as confidential and is not available to the public. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.14(b) (1972). Once a patent has issued, the public may inspect the complete file of the
application and its prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1972). Thus, the public may have
access to all documents which have passed between the patent attorney or agent and the
Patent Office during the prosecution of a patent application, provided that the application
matures into a patent. It is important to note, however, that private communications
between the inventor and his attorney or agent are not a part of this record.
During the prosecution of an application, an interference will be declared pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1971), whenever the applicant appears to have made the same claims
as another party who is either prosecuting a similar application or has an issued patent
which discloses and claims the same invention. Once an interference is declared, a quasijudicial, inter parte proceeding occurs within the Patent Office to determine which of the
inventors is the first inventor and is, therefore, entitled to the patent. Motions and other
documents raising various points of law are filed by both parties in an attempt to establish
priority of invention.
Discovery in an interference proceeding is of significant import and is governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Initial determinations relating to discovery are
made by the Board of Patent Interferences in the Patent Office, but, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 146 (1971), an applicant may appeal an unfavorable decision to the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia or the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.
A patent infringement action may be brought in a federal district court only after
the patent has issued. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1971). Infringement actions are often defended by a
contention that the patent allegedly infringed is not valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1971). This
defense brings the entire patent examining procedure into question, and the same issues
relating to patentability which were raised in the Patent Office, e.g., the questions of
novelty, utility and obviousness, are reconsidered. Access to the prosecution records and
attorney-client communications, therefore, become of the utmost importance in making
such a determination, and discovery sought by a party is quite often met with a claim
of privilege.
7 8 J. WGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542-43 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2290, at 543 (quoting from Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng.
Rep. 401, 406 (C.P. 1836)).
9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2290, at 543 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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advisers must be removed; hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent. 10

Wigmore has enunciated the elements of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6)
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 1

While the attorney-client privilege has a common law origin, the
work product rule is of modern vintage. 12 Basically, it grew out of the
present liberal federal discovery rules which were introduced in 1938
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 3 To prevent a party in an
action from conducting a mere "fishing expedition" into the private
affairs of the opposing party, the United States Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor14 established guidelines which effectively reduced
existing abuses in the application of the rules of discovery. Recognizing
that "the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's case" and
those "writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories"' 15 fall outside the attorney-client privilege, the Court deemed those writings to be the attorney's work product.
Hence, they were protected from discovery, provided that such writings
10 J.

WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2291, at 545.
11 J. WIaMoRE, supra note 7, § 2292, at 554 (footnote omitted).
12 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
13 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I) states in pertinent part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition
and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a), states:
Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce and permit the
party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf, to inspect and copy,
any designated documents (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which information can
be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices
into reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible
things ....
14 329 U.S. 495, 510-13 (1947). The court stated:
[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.
No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a
party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
15 Id. at 508.
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were prepared with an eye towards litigation and provided that there was
no showing of "good cause" for discovery by the party requesting production.' 6
In applying the attorney-client privilege and work product rule to
given fact situations, the courts have been faced with difficult policy
decisions. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the courts have
had to balance the need for full disclosure of all relevant evidence in the
pursuit of justice with the injury that would inure to the attorney-client
relationship by disclosure of confidential communications. 17 When
applying the work product rule, the courts have had to weigh the right
of an attorney to discover relevant documents of the opposing counsel
that are necessary to prepare the attorney's case with the right of the
opposing counsel to have the privacy and freedom from interference
which are necessary to prepare his own legal theories and plan his litigation strategy.' With these balancing tests in mind, the courts have,
nevertheless, freely allowed both of these immunities in a large variety
of situations involving general practitioners. 9
Unfortunately, such liberality has not, until recently, resulted in a
uniform extension of the attorney-client privilege and work product
rule to practitioners of patent law. 20 In large part, the resistance of the
courts has been due to a misconception 2' of (1) the nature of the patent

practitioner's work,22 (2) the relationship between the patent practitioner and his client, particularly where the client is a corporation, 2
(3) the unique qualifications demanded of a patent practitioner who
16
17
1950).
18
19

Id. at 511-12 n.10.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5 (D. Mass.

329 U.S. at 495, 510-14.
See cases cited note 4 supra.
20 See, e.g., United States Indus., Inc. v. Norton Co., 174 U.S.P.Q. 513, 515 (N.D.N.Y.
1972); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 361, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5, 7
(D. Mass. 1950).
21 For an excellent review of the attorney-client privilege and work product rule, see
Kayton, Attorney-Client Relations and Privilege, Work Product, PAT. L. PERSP. § B.7
(1331.40 A/R 1967-68), § B.7 (1-17 Dev. 1969-70), § B.7 (1, 3, 5 1971-Dev.) § B.7 (7-14, 1972
Dev.).
22 See general discussion note 6 supra.
23 For excellent reviews of the relationship of the patent attorney and patent agent
to the corporation, see Redmond, Corporate Patent Attorneys-"Privilege" and "Work
Product," 49 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 767 (1967); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied
to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956); Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege For Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REV. 424 (1970); Comment, The
Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and its
Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 235 (1961).
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practices before the Patent Office,2 4 and (4) the duty of the patent practitioner to resolve all questions of materiality in favor of full disclosure
25
to the Patent Office.
THE DEVELOPING LAW

The leading case in the area of the attorney-client privilege as it
relates to the patent practitioner is United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.26 The court extensively discussed the question of the
attorney-client privilege as it pertains to practitioners of patent law
and established the following guidelines for determining whether or
not a given communication falls within the purview of the privilege:
The privilege applies only if
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made
24 The qualifications of a patent practitioner eligible to practice before the Patent
Office are delineated in 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (1972):
(a) Attorneys at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice
before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of
the United States who fulfills the requirements and complies with the provisions
of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office ....
(b) Agents. Any citizen of the United States not an attorney at law who fulfills the requirements and complies with the provisions of these rules may be
admitted to practice before the Patent Office ....
(c) Requirements for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and
registered unless he . . . shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner
that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal
and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patents valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist
them in the presentation and prosecution of their applications before the Patent
Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a person . . . has
the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute,
and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and
passed....
25 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1971) requires full disclosure of the invention:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
In Monsanto Co. v. Rohn & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 164 U.S.P.Q. 556 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
456 F.2d 592, 172 U.S.P.Q. 323 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972), the district court
on rehearing asserted with regard to the issue of unclean hands that
[w]e believe that all questions of materiality in dealings with the Patent Office
ought to be resolved in favor of disclosure. Only such a standard can protect the
public from the deadening competitive effect of improvidently issued patents.
165 U.S.P.Q. 683, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
26 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5 (D. Mass. 1950).
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(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed
(a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and
(4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and
27
(b) not waived by the client.
Applying the above guidelines to letters, memoranda and the like,
which were addressed either to or from the defendant corporation's
patent department, the court ruled that such correspondence would not
be protected by the privilege unless those communications were with
outside or house counsel and pertained to legal advice sought by the
corporate client.28 In rationalizing its exclusion of the in-house patent
practitioner from the privilege, the court asserted:
Unlike the independent lawyer they are expected to have at the
forefront of their considerations business judgment, corporate policy and technical manufacturing aspects .... So far as the proffered
evidence in this case shows, the principal topics on which they
spend time are questions of business policy, [and] of competition
as disclosed by facts derived from third persons ....
*. . [T]he relationship of a person in the patent department
29
to the corporation is not that of attorney and client.
Having denied the corporate patent attorney the protection of the attorney-client privilege, the court went further and withheld the pro80
tection of the work product rule.
Some four years after the United Shoe decision, Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Radio Corp. of America,'1 while agreeing with the general principles
declared in United Shoe, nevertheless, attempted to redefine them and
render them more flexible. Although observing that a large portion of
27 Id. at 358, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 6. It is interesting to note that no authority was cited by
Judge Wyzanski in support of his construction of the elements of the privilege. Yet, the
courts have generally applied his guidelines in determining the scope of the atttorneyclient privilege.
28 Id. at 360, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 7.
29 Id. at 560-61, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 7.
80 Id. at 361, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 8.
81 121 F. Supp. 792, 101 U.S.P.Q. 316 (D. Del. 1954).
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patent attorneys' work involves non-legal business decisions, the court
recognized that in some circumstances their work did involve the application of legal principles and would, therefore, be protected by the
32
attorney-client privilege and work product rule.
In essence, the Zenith court adopted the position that each communication must be analyzed in the context of its own factual circumstances to determine the nature of the communication and whether, in
connection with the communication, the patent practitioner was "acting
as a lawyer."
They do [qualify for the privilege], for example, when in specific
matters they are engaged in applying rules of law to facts known
only to themselves and other employees of their client-companies,
and in preparing cases for and prosecuting appeals in the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and other like courts of record. They
do not "act as lawyers" when not primarily engaged in legal activities; when largely concerned with technical aspects of a business or
engineering character, or competitive considerations in their companies' constant race for patent proficiency, or the scope of public
patents, or even the general application of patent law to developments of their companies and competitors; when making initial
office preparatory determinations of patentability based on inventor's information, prior art, or legal tests for invention and novelty;
when drafting or comparing patent specifications and claims; when
preparing the application for letters patent or amendments thereto
and prosecuting same in the Patent Office; when handling interference proceedings in the Patent Office concerning patent applications.33
In considering the work product rule, the court maintained that,
with the exception of documents generated by house or outside counsel, which "qualify under their derivative privileges," documents originating in the patent department of a corporation were not ordinarily
deemed work product. However, it was recognized that in the preparation "for a trial of the required type," various papers pertaining to the
opinions, impressions and observations of a patent attorney, made with
an eye towards litigation, could be appropriately included within the
scope of the work product rule. On the contrary, various papers prepared in the course of routine practice before the Patent Office, such
as patent applications, amendments thereto, and papers relating to interferences, would not qualify due to the administrative nature of the
Patent Office proceedings and the different qualifications for admission
to Patent Office practice. The court rationalized that the preparation
32 Id. at 794, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 318.
33 Id. (footnote omitted).
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of such papers related only to a remote possibility of litigation, for example, a future infringement action; therefore, such activities were in84
sufficient to be encompassed by the work product rule.
Later cases have sharply disagreed with the broad proscriptions
laid down in the United Shoe and Zenith cases. In Ellis-Foster Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 8 the court, after criticizing Zenith,
denied Union Carbide's motion to compel Ellis-Foster to produce certain documents addressed from Ellis-Foster to an outside patent counsel. The documents in controversy related to the scope of claims to be
made in a patent application, the changes necessary to make the claims
acceptable to the examiner, and the advisability of pursuing an appeal
86
of the examiner's decision if adverse to the interests of Ellis-Foster.
Even though some of the work performed by the outside counsel could
have been done by non-legal individuals, it was concluded that he was,
nevertheless, acting as an attorney with respect to the documents in
issue and, therefore, qualified for the attorney-client privilege. The
court stated that the patent attorney was not automatically deprived of
the attorney-client privilege merely because he was involved in prose87
cution before the Patent Office.

Perhaps the pivotal case in generating the recent change in judicial
attitudes regarding the application of the attorney-client privilege to
patent practitioners is Sperry v. Florida.88 In Sperry, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Florida supreme court, 39 which had enjoined Sperry, a registered patent agent, from practicing before the
Patent Office because he was not a member of the Florida Bar and because, under Florida law, the preparation and prosecution of patent
applications for others constituted the practice of law. 40 The Court held
34 Id. at 795, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 319. Another reason cited by the court was the lack of
discovery techniques in the Patent Office rules of practice. Id. This contention is no longer
valid in view of 37 C.F.R. § 1.287(c) (1972) which states:
(c) Upon motion (§ 1.243) brought by a party during the period for preparation for testimony, or thereafter as authorized under § 1.245, and upon a showing
that the interest of justice so requires, the Board of Patent Interferences may order
additional discovery as to matters under the control of a party within the scope
of the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifying the
terms and conditions of such additional discovery. An order by the Board granting
or denying a motion under this paragraph shall not be subject to review prior to a
decision awarding priority.
8 159 F. Supp. 917, 116 U.S.P.Q. 576 (D.N.J. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 284 F.2d
917, 127 U.S.P.Q. 297 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 812 (1961).
86 Id. at 918, 116 U.S.P.Q. at 576-77.
87 Id. at 920, 116 U.S.P.Q. at 578.
88 373 U.S. 379, 137 U.S.P.Q. 578 (1963).
89 Id. at 404, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 588.
40 Id. at 381-82, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 579. The lower court decision is found in 140 So. 2d
587, 133 U.S.P.Q. 157 (Fla. 1962).
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that the supremacy clause precluded a state from preventing a registered agent from practicing before a federal administrative agency,
notwithstanding the fact that he was not admitted to the state bar.4 1 It
was emphasized that a patent agent acts like a lawyer in advising his
clients as to the patentability of their inventions under the federal
patent statute and as to alternative forms of protection available under
state law. Patent agents were also deemed to be acting like lawyers when
preparing patent applications (which the Court stated was one of the
most difficult of legal instruments to draft), amendments, appeal briefs,
and motions in which points of law pertaining to the patentability of
42
inventions are set forth.
373 U.S. at 383-85, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 580.
Id. at 383, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 579-80. It is interesting to note that in New Jersey, a
patent agent or a patent attorney, not admitted to the New Jersey Bar, is not able to engage in the following activities:
(a) He may not advise his client as to the ownership of an invention such as
where a question of ownership arises by virtue of employment or other contractual
relationship between his client and others.
(b) He may not advise his client as to what the client's rights may be under
forms of legal protection available under federal or state law which are alternate
to patent protection, such as trade secrets, unfair competition, trade marks [sic],
copyrights, and anti-trust law; provided, however, that he may advise his client
that there are alternate forms of legal protection on which he should seek advice
from an attorney admitted to practice in this state.
(c) He may not advise a client on matters concerning the validity of a patent,
except incident to the filing and prosecution of a patent application.
(d) He may not advise a client on matters concerning the infringement of a
patent, except incident to the filing and prosecution of a patent application.
(e) He may not advise a client in matters concerning the scope of the monopoly granted in a patent, except incident to the filing and prosecution of a patent
application.
(f) He may not prepare contracts or licenses dealing with patent rights.
(g) He may not prepare assignments of patent rights, except such assignments
as are filed simultaneously with a patent application.
(h) He may not advise his client in matters concerning contracts, licenses or
assignments dealing with patent rights except as the same may directly affect and
be incident to the filing and prosecution of a patent application.
(i) He may not advise a client respecting litigation in the Courts of the State
of New Jersey, including litigation involving issues arising under patent law.
(j) He may not advise clients concerning rights or liabilities in connection
with trade marks nor may he represent clients in the assertion of trade mark
rights or in defense of liability under trade mark rules.
(k) He may not represent clients in the filing and prosecution of applications
for registration of trade marks nor the prosecution of oppositions to the registration of trade marks in the United States Patent Office unless and except to the
extent that Congress may preempt this field of law. He may not represent clients
in the filing and prosecution of applications for registration of trade marks nor
in the prosecution oppositions to the registration of trade marks in the Office
of the Secretary of State of New Jersey.
Certain of the proponents' questions on which an advisory opinion of this
Committee is requested deal with the matter of appeals taken outside of the
United States Patent Office from a decision made in the United States Patent
Office. A Patent Attorney, not admitted to the practice of law in New Jersey, may
41

42
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The Sperry decision forced the courts to reevaluate the scope of the
attorney-client and work product immunities in relation to the patent
practitioner and provided the courts with a basis to conclude that he
should come within the purview of the immunities, provided he otherwise complied with their requirements.
The later case of Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp.43 held that communications containing infringement and patentability opinions to or
from house patent counsel fell within the purview of the attorney-client
privilege. The impact of Sperry was noted:
That the activities of a patent lawyer may constitute the practice
of law seems to be well settled [by Sperry] .... The question, then,
becomes whether the particular activities involved in the preparation and contents of the documents in question fall within the
gambit of the practice of law rather than business or technical advice.44
Turning to the particular activity of a patent attorney, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held in Natta v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. 45 that papers sent to du Pont management from du Pont patent at-

torneys, which analyzed the nature of du Pont's case in an interference
proceeding, were protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the
work product rule. The court, thus, construed the Hickman v. Taylor
holding as not requiring a proceeding before a court of record.46 Another Third Circuit case, In re Natta,47 decided at the district court
level, extended the attorney-client and work product immunities to inas an incident to the preparation and prosecution of a patent application before
the United States Patent Office advise his client as to the availability of appeals
which may be taken outside of the United States Patent Office from a decision
made in the United States Patent Office and of the nature and effect of such appeals. Whether he may lawfully represent the appellant in such an appeal is a
matter peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the appellate court-if he makes
known to the appellate court that he is not a member of the Bar of the state in
or from which he is practicing and the appellate court with such knowledge permits him to represent the appellant, his conduct certainly will not be deemed by
this Committee to constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
9 N.J. Sup. CT. COMM. ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW OPINIONs 5-7 (1972), reproduced in 95 N.J.L.J. 269, 279 (1972).
43 172 U.S.P.Q. 46 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
44 Id. at 47.
45 410 F.2d 187, 161 U.S.P.Q. 389 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Montecatini Edison
S.p.A. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 396 U.S. 836 (1969). In the United States Patent
Quarterly, this case is entitled as it appears in the text; however, in the official federal reporter the case is entitled In re Natta. Hereinafter the case will be referred to as Natta
v. du Pont.
46 410 F.2d at 192-94, 161 U.S.P.Q. at 391-94.
47 48 F.R.D. 319, 163 U.S.P.Q. 680 (D. Del. 1969).
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clude documents relating to ex parte prosecution before the Patent
Office.

48

In a continuation of the trend away from the Zenith and United
Shoe decisions, Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc.4 9 held that, if a validity opinion was made with an eye towards litigation and prepared by a general outside patent counsel, it was
protected from discovery by the work product rule, even though the
subject litigation was completely prospective in nature. 50
More recently, the United States Court of Claims in Ledex, Inc. v.
United States51 rejected both the Zenith and United Shoe holdings and
held that communications relating to patentability studies and patent
applications were privileged.5 2
While substantial questions may still exist as to the scope of the
attorney-client privilege and work product rule in patent matters, it is
clear that Sperry has placed the patent attorney on a nearly equal footing with his general practitioner counterpart. Despite the impact that
Sperry has had on the application of the attorney-client privilege and
work product rule to patent practitioners, many of the courts have, unfortunately, paid mere lip service to Sperry in resisting the extension of
these immunities to patent agents. 53 For example, Joh. A. Benckiser,
G.m.b.H., Chemische Fabrik v. Hygrade Products Corp.54 held that
patent agents do not qualify for the attorney-client privilege because
they are not members of a bar of any court, thereby adhering to the
criteria set down in United Shoe.55 The Benckiser holding might,
however, be construed as having been modified by the later case of
Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. GAF Corp.,56 wherein a patent agent
working directly under the control and direction of a patent attorney
was held to be qualified to assert the attorney-client privilege. 57
Notwithstanding this general denial to patent agents of the protection afforded by the attorney-client and work product privileges, no less
of an authority than Wigmore has asserted that the privilege should, at
Id. at 321, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 681.
47 F.R.D. 334, 162 U.S.P.Q. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
50 Id. at 337, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 510.
51 172 U.S.P.Q. 538 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
52 Id. at 539.
53 Better authority concludes that there is no reason to exclude administrative practitioners from cothing within the ambit of the privilege, so long as they otherwise comply
with its requirements. See, e.g., 51 MicH. L. REv. 601 (1953).
54 253 F. Supp. 999, 149 U.S.P.Q. 28 (D.N.J. 1966).
55 Id. at 1000-01, 149 U.S.P.Q. at 28.
56 164 U.S.P.Q. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
57 Id. at 377.
48
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the very least, encompass communications between a client and an agent
who is authorized to practice before an administrative agency.
A correct test for recognizing professional privilege would seem
to be this: If the administrative department ... requires an oath of
office and prior proof of professional qualifications and maintains
a list of registered persons so qualified, or if in any other way its
regulations treat the special practitioners as a licensed body having
the responsibility of attorneys and subject to professional discipline,
then the parties so represented are in the status of clients, and the
clients are therefore entitled to the appropriate consequences,
including the confidentiality of communications. This is so whether
the special practitioners are skilled in the general body of law or
only in the matter peculiar to the department. 58
Equating the functions of a practitioner before an administrative
agency with those of an attorney-at-law, Wigmore stated:
The proceedings before such [administrative] bodies are conducted
under more or less formal rules of procedure; the hearings and the
decisions are quasi-judicial in nature; the specialist, as the client's
agent, has a natural and a responsible part in presenting the client's
case. The client must confide in the agent precisely as he does in the
attorney. There is every reason .
for recognizing a privilege for
those confidences. 59
In at least one case, Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 60 the court
held that the attorney-client privilege attached to certain communications between American patent attorneys and British patent agents. 61
Nonetheless, the courts appear to be fairly consistent in excluding such
communications from protection under either the attorney-client privi62
lege or work product rule.
Turning to another aspect of the general problem, an interesting
question arises when a corporation asserts the attorney-client privilege
-When is the corporation, in fact, seeking legal advice? In an attempt
58

J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2300a, at 582.

59 Id.

54 F.R.D. 44, 172 U.S.P.Q. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
61 Id. at 48, 172 U.S.P.Q at 203
62 For cases denying the extension of the attorney-client privilege and the work product rule to patent agents, see, eg., Rayette-Faberge v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 163 U.S.P.Q.
373 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Joh. A. Benkiser G.m.b.H. Chemische Fabrik v. Hygrade Food Prod.
Corp., 253 F. Supp. 99, 149 U.S.P.Q. 28 (D.N.J. 1966); Ledex, Inc. v. United States, 172
U.S.P.Q. 538 (Ct. Cl. 1972). For cases extending the privilege and/or work product rule to
patent agents, see, e.g., Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 172 U.S.P.Q. 201
(N.D. Cal. 1971) (privilege extended to British patent agents); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v.
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 164 U.S.P.Q. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (privilege extended to patent
agent supervised by patent attorney).
60
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to answer this question, City of Philadelphiav. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.63 established what has been termed the "control group test":

[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he
may be, is in a position [1] to control or even [2] to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may
take upon the advice of the attorney, or [3] if he is an authorized
member of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect,
he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure
to the lawyer and the privilege would apply. In all other cases the
employee would be merely giving information to the lawyer to enable the latter to advise those in the corporation having the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advise.6 4
This rule has been generally followed by the courts. However, in a
recent case, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,6 5 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that
an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the
employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors
in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the duties
66
of his employment.
In so holding, the court recognized that decision-making authority
should not be the sine qua non of the privilege when it is claimed by
a corporate client.
With the latter brief overview in mind, a detailed circuit-by-circuit
analysis of the state of the law in this area will now be presented.
CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

FIRST COURT

The foremost case in the First Circuit relating to the attorney-client
privilege is United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,67 which
discussed comprehensively the application of the attorney-client privilege in the area of patent law. The guidelines previously set forth,6 8 for
determining whether or not a given communication comes within the
68 210 F. Supp. 483 (ED. Pa. 1962).

64 Id. at 485.
65 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 400 US. 348, rehearing denied, 401

U.S. 950 (1971).
423 F.2d at 491-92.
89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5 (D. Mass. 1950).
68 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
66
67
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purview of the attorney-client privilege, have been the subject of much
litigation since they were handed down.
The documents in question in United Shoe fell into four categories: (1) letters to or from independent lawyers of a law partnership;
(2) letters to or from the corporate defendant's legal department; (3)
letters to or from the corporate defendant's patent department; and (4)
working papers of those employed in the corporate defendant's patent
department.8 9 Applying the guidelines to the first group of letters, those
to or from independent lawyers, Judge Wysanski concluded that with
respect to this class of correspondence the members of the law partnership were acting as attorneys, giving legal, not business advice. Any
portions of the letters which gave opinions on the law or otherwise
rendered legal services based on information furnished by an officer or
employee of the defendant corporation fell within the purview of the
privilege. Such information had to be given in confidence and out of
the presence of third persons who would automatically destroy that
confidence.7 0 However, even legal advice would not be privileged when
71
the facts upon which it was based were otherwise publicly available.
Thus, so much of a lawyer's letter that relates to a fact gleaned from a
public document, such as a patent, would not be privileged.
In reference to the second group of communications, those letters
to or from the house counsel of the defendant corporation, the court
held that there was no significant difference between outside counsel
and house counsel. As long as the attorney and his clerks were acting as
lawyers in accordance with the other requirements of the attorney-client
privilege, the privilege could be invoked with respect to this class of
correspondence, subject, of course, to the same restrictions imposed
72
upon outside counsel.
Regarding those letters to or from individuals in the corporate
defendant's patent department, Judge Wyzanski stated that, except
where the letters were to or from outside or house counsel and their
staff, the letters were not privileged since they pertained, in general, to
questions of business policy.73 No independent application of the privilege was held to attach because none of the patent office employees were
members of the Massachusetts bar; all of the individuals freely communicated with other corporate officers and employees during the
course of their duties; and the tasks performed by them generally
89 F. Supp. at 359-61, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
70 Id. at 359, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 360, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 7.
78 Id. at 360, 85 U.S.P.Q. at '7-8.
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Finally, regarding
subserviated legal considerations to business
the work product of the corporate patent attorneys, the court ruled
that, because the attorneys did not qualify under the attorney-client
privilege, the work product rule was also not applicable to them. 75
A more recent First Circuit case, American Optical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 76 was confronted with the question of whether Medtronic
should be compelled to produce documents prepared by its patent
counsel and by its outside counsel for which it claimed attorney-client
protection and, concurrently or alternatively, work product protection.
The communications involved, in part, a patent validity-infringement
study. Although United Shoe was decided by the same court during an
earlier term, American Optical chose to ignore it and held that documents transmitted from an outside attorney or house counsel to the
corporate client were protected under both the work product rule and
77
the attorney-client privilege.
While the holding of the case does not appear to contradict United
Shoe, the court's statement of the issue before it suggests ambiguity:
[The issue is] whether Medtronic is to be forced to produce documents written by its patent counsel, for which it claims either an
attorney-client privilege, a work product privilege, or both.78
It is not clear whether the patent counsel referred to was a member of
the general corporate legal department or was a house patent counsel.
If the references to house counsel during the course of the opinion
pertain to a house patent counsel, then American Optical departs rather
dramatically from that portion of the United Shoe opinion which
prohibited the applicability of the work product rule and attorney-client
privilege to documents generated by in-house patent attorneys.
SECOND CIRCUIT

The general issue in Georgia-PacificPlywood Co. v. United States
Plywood Corp.79 was whether communications between a house counsel
and his corporate client were privileged when the house counsel was
not a member of the bar of the jurisdiction where he worked. The
court, citing United Shoe, agreed that there was no distinction between
74
75
78
77
78
79

Id. at 360, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 7.
Id. at 361, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 8.
175 U.S.P.Q. 635 (D. Mass. 1972).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 635.
18 F.R.D. 463, 108 U.S.P.Q. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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an independent practitioner and a house counsel and that both qualified
for the attorney-client privilege. The major consideration with respect
to a claim for the attorney-client privilege is whether the attorney was
acting as a lawyer in connection with the particular communication in
issue.8 0 In the instant case, the house counsel was the director of both
the legal and patent departments of the defendant corporation. Yet, in
determining that the privilege was applicable, the court emphasized
evidence indicating the attorney was acting in his capacity as director
of the legal department and not in his capacity as director of the
patent department.8 ' By implication, the court's reasoning and specific
discounting of the attorney's role as a patent lawyer leads to the
conclusion that had the attorney been acting as a patent attorney, he
would not have been within the penumbra of the attorney-client privilege.
Communications dealing exclusively with the solicitation or giving
of business advice, or with the technical engineering aspects of
patent procurement or with any other matters which may as easily
be handled by laymen are not privileged.
Although a substantial part of [the attorney's] duties for
United States Plywood was undoubtedly non-legal, he was, nevertheless, head of the legal department maintained by United States
Plywood, did participate actively in the prior litigation and argued
matters in court, took depositions, etc. He is therefore, entitled to
be considered a house counsel rather than a patent lawyer within
82
the precedent cited.
As to the general issue of whether or not a house counsel who was
not a member of the bar of the jurisdiction where the litigation occurred
could avail himself of the privilege, the court asserted that local bar
membership was not essential to claim the privilege, so long as house
corporate counsel was a member of some bar.
To hold otherwise would be to place more emphasis on form
rather than substance and to blind ourselves to the realities which
exist in the representation of a corporation national in scope with
litigation reaching into many states.8s
However, it appears that inasmuch as the court did not extend the
privilege to "patent attorneys" per se, it honored form over substance
by classifying the attorney as house counsel, thereby circumventing the
Id. at 464, 108 U.S.P.Q. at 295.
Id. at 464-65, 108 U.S.P.Q. at 295.
82 id. (citations omitted).
83 Id. at 466, 108 U.S.P.Q. at 296.
80
81
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issue of whether a patent attorney would be protected under similar
circumstances.

84
In Stix Products,Inc. v. United Merchants& Manufacturers,Inc.,

it was held that a patent validity opinion prepared by a patent law firm
was eligible for work product protection, even though the corporate
client was not joined in the law suit and even though a restricted copy
of the opinion had been given to plaintiff's legal counsel. Relying on
the Hickman "eye-toward-litigation" test, the court concluded that the
test had been met since the opinion was prompted by the issuance of
a patent and there was a substantial likelihood that the client would be
called upon to defend a subsequent infringement suit based upon the
patent. 85 Thus, in effect, the court held that actual prospective litigation was not a prerequisite to a claim for work product protection,
although there had to be an identifiable prospect of litigation. This
standard, when compared with Zenith's exclusion of matter prepared
with only a remote possibility of litigation, 6 would probably expand
the availability of work product protection due to its positive emphasis
on the need for only a prospect of litigation. With regard to the issue
of waiver, the court held that inasmuch as there was a community of
interest between the plaintiff and the client, the transmittal of the
copy of the validity opinion to plaintiff's legal counsel did not constitute
a waiver. "The work-product privilege should not be deemed waived
unless the disclosure is inconsistent with maintaining secrecy from
87
possible adversaries."
In D & S Plug Corp. v. Colvin Motor Parts, Inc.,88 it was held that,
although an attorney had performed the tasks in connection with a
patentability determination, his determination of patentability was not
protected under the attorney-client or work product immunities because those services could have been rendered by a non-attorney. The
court deemed such "services" to include: (1) letters from plaintiff's
attorney to a "patent expert" requesting him to conduct a patentability
search; (2) a return letter from the patent expert to the attorney indicating the results of the search; (3) a letter from plaintiff's attorney
to the patent expert asking whether the patentability search was thorough enough to obviate a subsequent infringement search; and (4) a
return letter from the patent expert indicating that no infringement
84
85
86
87
88

47 F.R.D. 334, 162 U.S.P.Q. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 337-38, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 510.
121 F. Supp. at 795, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 319.
47 F.R.D. at 338, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 511.
166 U.S.P.Q. 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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search was necessary.89 A fifth communication, a letter from the plaintiff's attorney to the plaintiff informing him of the results of the search
and expressing the attorney's opinion with regard to the patentability
of the product involved, was deemed to contain an attorney's legal
advice and, therefore, was protected under the work product rule or
attorney-client privilege.
A close reading of the case indicates that D & S Plug may have advanced the attorney-client privilege in the Second Circuit. For example,
in Stix Products the validity opinion was deemed protected only because
it was made with an eye-toward litigation which, although prospective
in nature, was nonetheless identifiable in view of specific infringement
claims that had arisen prior to the preparation of the opinion.9 0 In
D & S Plug, however, there was no identifiable litigation at the time
of the patentability opinion, but only the remote possibility of a later
infringement action. Thus, it appears that D & S Plug may represent a
broadening of the work product rule in the Second Circuit to include
any legal advice given in confidence by an attorney without identifiable
litigation.
United States Industries,Inc. v. Norton Co.,9 ' decided after D & S
Plug, involved a request by the plaintiff for admissions concerning
communications by, to, or from Norton's house patent attorneys and
documents otherwise connected with activities involving Norton house
patent attorneys. The court held it would not "break new ground,"
but would follow the "sound judicial company" represented by United
92
Shoe, Zenith and GeorgiaPacific.
In view of Norton, the law in the Second Circuit appears to be

confused.
TmRu CIRcurr
The Third Circuit has been quite active in the area of the attorneyclient privilege and the work product rule. The leading case in the
circuit is Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America.9 The question
before the court pertained to Zenith's motion for production of docu-

ments. As is discussed in more detail in the foregoing overview, Judge
Leahy agreed with the general principles declared in United Shoe
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 392.
47 F.R.D. at 337, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 510.
174 U.S.P.Q. 513 (N.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 515.
121 F. Supp. 792, 101 U.S.P.Q. 316 (D. Del. 1954).
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relating to the application of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product rule to the letters and memoranda of house and independent
general counsel.9 4 However, with regard to letters, memoranda, and
other similar correspondence originating in a corporate patent department, the Zenith court attempted to redefine and render more flexible
the somewhat dogmatic generalizations handed down by Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe. The Zenith court asserted that while attorneys and
employees of a corporate patent department are generally engaged in
non-legal activities, in unusual circumstances they might, nevertheless,
deviate from this routine work and perform work of a protectable
nature.
Essentially, attorneys and employees of defendants' patent departments are engaged in a type of non-legal work to which the attorney-client privilege and "work product" exemption do not attach.
In unusual instances, however, they may so deviate from routine
work as to qualify. Hereinafter, criteria for non-production are
established which resolve the greater part of the conflict, but sufficient elasticity has been provided to encompass the exceptional
patent department document. With so many documents written
under varying circumstances and times, one blanket ruling on their
production would unnecessarily risk inaccuracies of generalization.9 5
In dealing with the attorney-client privilege, the court defined the
privilege's application to patent department attorneys only by example.
Thus, an attorney-employee of the patent department would be acting
as a lawyer and, therefore, qualify for the privilege when analyzing facts
from a legal standpoint which are known only to employees of the
client companies. For example, work done preparatory to litigation or
appeals in courts of record would justify application of the privilege.
However by specifically excluding certain other activities from any
protection, the court attempted to give working bounds by which other
activities might be considered. Thus, when such employees are primarily engaged in technical and business activities or in the preparation
and prosecution of patent applications, protection under the privilege
would not be warranted. These activities include not only the preparation of patentability studies based upon information from the inventor,
legal tests for invention and novelty, and infringement studies, but also
the handling of interference proceedings in the Patent Office.96 These
activities were not deemed to be "hallmark activities of attorneys"
94

Id. at 794, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 318. See notes 71 and 72 supra and accompanying text.

95 Id. at 793, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 317-18.
96 Id. at 794, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 318.
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since patent agents and other non-lawyers may practice before the Patent
97
Office.
Turning to the work product rule, the court maintained that,
with the exception of documents to or from house general counsel or
outside counsel, documents originating in the patent department of a
corporation were not ordinarily the work product of an attorney. It
was recognized, however, that in the course of preparation for trial
various papers relating to the opinions, impressions, and observations
of a patent attorney made in actual preparation for litigation could be
protected under the work product rule.9 8
The trend in recent Third Circuit cases has been away from the
broad restrictions on the immunities expressed in earlier cases.9 9 In
Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,10 0 Union Carbide,
citing United Shoe and Zenith as authorities supporting its request,
sought production of certain letters from various officers of Ellis Foster
to an outside patent attorney. The letters related to two patent applications of Ellis Foster, one of which had been abandoned, and was, therefore, preserved in secrecy in the Patent Office. The letters generally
concerned the prosecution of the patent in dispute and specifically
related to the scope of the claims to be made, the changes deemed
necessary to make the claims acceptable to the patent examiner, and,
if the examiner's final decision were adverse, the advisability of taking
an appeal. 10' In denying Union Carbide's request, the court held that a
patent attorney's dealings with his client are privileged if the dealings
involve more than mere technical matters. In the instant case, all of
the letters in question involved legal questions concerning technical
matters and were deemed to have been written in strict confidence.
The trial court judge, Judge Meany, after criticizing the Zenith
decision, concluded that even though some of the work performed by
the outside patent attorney could have been done by non-legal individuals, the correspondence specifically involved here indicated that
throughout the course of his activities he was "acting as an attorney."'10 2
Presumably alluding to Judge Leahy's decision in Zenith, Judge Meany
summed up by disapproving of those decisions which suggest that no
Id. at 794 n.1, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 318.
Id. at 795, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 319.
99 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 101 U.S.P.Q. 316
(D. Del. 1954); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. 5
(D. Mass. 1950).
100 159 F. Supp. 917, 116 U.S.P.Q. 576 (D.N.J. 1958).
97
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101 Id. at 918, 116 U.S.P.Q. at 576.
102

Id. at 919-20, 116 U.S.P.Q. at 578.
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attorney-client privilege was available in certain sectors of patent practice.
I find myself unable to agree with the implied contention that
because an attorney happens to be engaged in the field of patents
in which field non-attorneys are authorized to practice, he is ipso
facto deprived of his status as a lawyer in every activity in which
he operates so long as a patent prosecution is involved.103
In American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co.,104 which paid
allegiance to the general guideline set down in Zenith'0 5 that the legal
role of the house patent attorney in the preparation of the document
be the basis of judgment, the court granted American Cyanamid's motion for the production of documents. The documents pertained to communications between a house patent attorney and the defendant
corporation. The communications included a listing of certain patents
of interest, a listing of pertinent prior art, and the results of an infringement study. Accepting the general maximum laid down in Zenith that
employees of a corporate patent department ordinarily do not act as
attorneys in the general application of patent law to developments of
their companies and their competitors, the court stated that the house
patent attorney involved in the case was not acting in the capacity of a
lawyer since he had neither applied law to facts supplied to him by his
client, nor prepared the documents in issue "in order to defend or
assert a claim in court."'1 6 The court emphasized, however, that
[it did] not mean to suggest that if outside counsel were performing
the same tasks they would not be "acting as lawyers." That question is not before the court. However, the "mere physical proximity of house counsel ...and the relative ease with which he
could be converted into a privileged sanctuary
for corporate
07
records" . . . suggests a basis for distinction.
Turning to Hercules' motion to produce certain letters pertaining
to infringement studies that were written to American Cyanamid by
outside counsel, the court held that the letters were not within the
purview of the privilege since they did not rest on confidential information disclosed by the client in order to obtain legal advice. The letters
contained analyses of patents, the claims therein, and products which
Id. at 920, 116 U.S.P.Q. at 578.
104 211 F. Supp. 85, 135 U.S.P.Q. 235 (D. Del. 1962).
105 121 F. Supp. at 794, 101 U.S.P.Q. at 318.
106 211 F. Supp. at 89, 135 U.S.P.Q. at 238.
107 Id. at 90 n.20, 135 U.S.P.Q. at 238 (relying on and quoting from Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 953, 973 (1956)).
103
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were manufactured thereunder. Citing United Shoe, the court agreed
that
there is no privilege for so much of a lawyer's letter, report, or opinion as relates to a fact gleaned.

a patent.108

. .

from a public document such as

In view of the fact that the letters were based completely on public
documents, no attorney-client immunity was held to attach. 10 9
In Sperti Products,Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 11 0 the court construed the
holding in American Cyanamid as approving of the rule not to extend
the immunity to communications between corporate officers or employees and employee-attorneys. While the holding in American Cyanamid related only to in-house counsel, the court made the general statement that the documents drafted by outside counsel and communicated
to their corporate client would come within the coverage of the privilege and, thus, the Sperti interpretation was correct."'
American Cyanamid, if adding little to the Third Circuit law on
the attorney-client privilege, nevertheless provides a striking example
of a judge not practicing what he preaches. On the one hand, Judge
Wright in American Cyanamid criticized the holding in United Shoe
that the privilege should be accorded to the house counsel of a corporation, but not to the members of its patent department. He argued that
a blanket exclusion of house patent attorneys was unjustified and that
the court should determine on a case-by-case basis whether or not a
house patent attorney was acting in the lawyer-like fashion required
to bring him within the coverage of the privilege. 112 On the other hand,
however, he asserted that the physical proximity of the corporate house
counsel and patent counsel posed the danger of converting the latter
into " 'a privileged sanctuary for corporate records,' "118 and based
part of his holding on that consideration. While perhaps only a caveat
applicable to a case involving an in-house patent attorney, this comment might be construed as a retrenchment of the dual standard
approach advocated in United Shoe.
Presented with the question of whether registered patent agents
may qualify for the attorney-client privilege, even though not licensed
108 Id. at 90, 135 U.S.P.Q. at 239 (quoting from United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Co., 89 F. Supp. at 359, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 6).
109 211 F. Supp. at 90, 135 U.S.P.Q. at 239.
110 152 U.S.P.Q. 790 (D. Del. 1966).
ill 211 F. Supp. at 90, 135 U.S.P.Q. at 238-39.
112 Id. at 88-89, 135 U.S.P.Q. at 237-38.
118 Id. at 89-80 n.20, 135 U.S.P.Q. at 238 (quoting from Simon, supra note 107, at 973).
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to practice law as members of the bar of any state, the court in Joh. A.
Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chemische Fabrik v. Hygrade Food Products
Corp.1 14 held that they were not entitled to any protection under the
attorney-client privilege. The agents were equated with certified public
accountants who, while authorized to practice before the Internal
Revenue Service, nevertheless, enjoyed no privilege that an attorney
15
might.
Three years later, Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. GAF Corp.116
held that inasmuch as the attorney-client privilege extends to agents
or immediate subordinates of attorneys, the mere fact that a patent
agent is not an attorney-at-law does not conclusively bar a claim for the
attorney-client privilege. 117 It should be pointed out, however, that the
agent involved in the case was under the control and direction of outside patent attorneys. The case is, therefore, consistent with the Wigmore position that an agent under the direct control of an attorney
should qualify for the privilege.
Sperti Products, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. 118 directly confronted the
question of whether outside patent attorneys are acting as lawyers
pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, or whether they are acting in
a non-legal capacity when representing their clients before the Patent
Office in connection with matters such as drafting claims, prosecuting
patent applications, and acting with reference to interference proceedings. It was maintained that these activities might come within the
purview of the attorney-client privilege since the rulings in American
Cyanamid and Zenith might be inconsistent with the holding in Sperry
1 9 In Sperry, the United States Supreme Court reversed a
v. Florida."
ruling by the Florida supreme court that banned practice before the
Patent Office by anyone not a member of the Florida Bar. This, the
Sperti court asserted, inferred "that Patent Office activities by a person
duly qualified to practice in that office, [constituted] one type of prac2x
ticing law."' 120 Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc.,1
was cited to reinforce the conclusion that, with respect to Patent Office
proceedings, an outside patent attorney's communications with his
253 F. Supp. 999, 149 U.S.P.Q. 28 (D.N.J. 1966).
Id. at 1001, 149 U.S.P.Q. at 29.
49 F.R.D. 82, 164 U.S.P.Q. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Id. at 84, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 377.
118 152 U.S.P.Q. 790 (D. Del. 1966).
119 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
120 152 U.S.P.Q. at 792.
114
115
116
117

121

255 F. Supp. 1020, 1022, 150 U.S.P.Q. 426, 428 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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client were immune from discovery under the attorney-client privilege.
122
This ruling, the Sperti court asserted, was "eminently reasonable."'
It, nevertheless, appears that the court's actual rulings concerning
the individual documents in question in the case were guided by the
two basic principles enunciated in United Shoe and Zenith: (1) that
a document would not be privileged if it were based solely upon public
documents, decisional law or information supplied by third parties or
sources other than the client's disclosures; and (2) that a privilege exists
when the attorney acts as a lawyer. Thus, although there is broad dicta
in the case about Patent Office activities constituting the practice of
law and, by inference, having a direct effect on house patent attorneys,
Sperti could be read to exclude infringement opinions and patent
validity studies from the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Gentex Corp.123 involved a patent infringement suit against Gentex in which a motion
was made for the production of documents pertaining to novelty studies
and papers relating to the filing of the patent in suit. The same court
which decided American Cyanamid held that these documents were not
within the purview of the attorney-client privilege. Citing Zenith, the
court held that ex parte papers prepared in connection with the filing
and prosecution of a patent application in the Patent Office do not
constitute the giving of legal advice, except insofar as they may have
1 24
been produced during a controversy pending in a court of record.
In other words, it was held that the day-to-day activities of a patent
attorney engaged in patent solicitation do not constitute legal advice
unless they involve the application of legal rules to facts involving
pending litigation. The broad dicta enunciated in Sperti, with its appealing logic for extending the privilege to ex parte and inter parte
prosecution before the Patent Office, were not employed.
The court also refused to grant protection under the work product
rule, since the documents in question were not prepared with an eyetoward litigation, but rather were formulated in the ordinary conduct
of day-to-day business. However, it was held that letters between the
corporation and its patent attorney pertaining to a possible infringement of its patents did come within the privilege, since they sought
professional advice regarding potential litigation. 125 Thus, Minnesota
122
123
124
125

152
153
153
Id.

U.S.P.Q. at 792.
U.S.P.Q. 110, rehearingdenied, 153 U.S.P.Q. 334 (D. Del. 1967).
U.S.P.Q. at 111.
at 111-12.
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Mining added little to the developing law in the Third Circuit and
generally followed the Zenith holding with respect to the application of
the attorney-client privilege and the work product rule.
Beginning in 1967 and extending through 1969, the law in the
Third Circuit moved toward increased protection of patent attorneys'
activities. In In re Natta126 the court, speaking through Judge Layton,
was confronted with a motion for production of documents in a fourparty patent interference proceeding that was pending before the Patent
Office. Citing Zenith as precedent, the court specifically adopted
Zenith's argument excluding ex parte and inter parte prosecution
papers from protection under the attorney-client privilege. 127 Many of
the papers in question involved applications before the Patent Office,
amendments thereto, and other documents relating to the interference.
Consequently, they were excluded from the protection of the privilege,
since under Zenith, employees expediting such matters were not acting
12
as lawyers.
Fortunately for patent practitioners, Judge Layton reconsidered
his position in Sperry Rand Corp. v. International Business Machine
Corp.,1 29 which involved a motion for the production of certain papers

during a patent interference proceeding. At least part of the communications generated by an attorney-employee of IBM involved analyses of
IBM's position, the development of IBM's case for presentation to the
examiner, the conduct of depositions, and the preparation of motions
before the Patent Office and in the district court. After synopsizing the
development in the Third Circuit of the attorney-client privilege insofar as it pertained to patent practitioners, Judge Layton departed from
the Zenith rationale and held that
the claim of attorney-client privilege

. . .

[was] not without merit

on its face simply because the communications [involved therein]
were made in connection with a Patent Office proceeding13 0
Thus, Judge Layton modified his earlier position by removing the
exclusionary threshold question of whether or not the communications
involved matters before the Patent Office, and directly applied the
standard elements of the attorney-client privilege to the documents
in issue. If the privilege had been available in the district court had the
action been there on appeal, the court could not rationalize the applica126 264 F. Supp. 734, 153 U.S.P.Q. 11 (D. Del. 1967).
127 Id. at 741, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 17.
128 Id. at 739-42, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 16-18.

129 45 F.R.D. 287, 159 U.S.P.Q. 86 (D. Del. 1968).
130 Id. at 291, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 89.
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tion of a different standard in the Patent Office proceeding. With
regard to the application of the work product rule, the court, applying
the same logic used with regard to the attorney-client privilege, again
departed from the Zenith view that there could be no successful claim
of work product when the material was prepared for the prosecution
of an interference proceeding in the Patent Office.13'
Sperry Rand constituted a major breakthrough for patent attorneys
practicing in the Third Circuit, although it was consistent with the
opinion in Ellis-Foster delivered some ten years earlier. Moreover
the Sperry Rand decision removed a major consideration that had stood
in the way of any grant of immunity for patent attorneys by stating
the converse of Zenith: "These [patent] activities are ... the 'hallmark
activities of a lawyer.' "182
The precedential value of Sperry Rand was left in doubt, however,
because the court emphasized the fact that the attorney-employee was a
member of IBM's legal department, and not a member of its "patent
engineering department," thereby implying that a different conclusion
1 33
would have been reached had the attorney been a patent attorney.
Nevertheless, the court clearly indicated that the Patent Office forum
was no longer a basis for the non-applicability of the attorney-client
privilege. 34 The obvious question left unanswered by Sperry Rand is
whether the privilege could logically be extended to an in-house patent
attorney who only practices before the Patent Office.
In Natta v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 135 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals was confronted with reports from du Pont attorneys
to du Pont management personnel analyzing du Pont's position in an
interference and evaluating its prospects for success. Natta argued that
the modem trend of the law rejected the idea that material relevant to
a pending patent application may be withheld by either the applicant
or his attorney.13 6 The court rejected this contention and decided that
while there is a conflict between the policy of full and candid disclosure
to the public in all matters regarding patents and the policy of protecting confidential communications between an attorney and his client,
the proper application of work product and attorney-client privilege
[would not] be detrimental to the public interest or offend para181 See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
182 45 F.R.D. at 290, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 89 (footnote omitted).
183 Id.
184

Id. at 291, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 89-90.

:3M

410 F.2d 187, 161 U..'.Q. 389 (3d Cir. 1969).

186 Id. at 190, 161 US.P.Q. at 391.
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mount federal patent policy whenever a patent solicitation is in7
volved.13
In addition, the court construed Hickman v. Taylor 38 to hold that the
work product rule is applicable in a pending interference proceeding.'39
Concluding this period of rapid law development in the Third
Circuit, Judge Layton in yet another case entitled In re Natta140 voiced
a modification of the position enunciated in Sperry Rand'4 ' by holding-.
that "a claim of privilege can be made as to documents relating both to
ex parte proceedings and interference proceedings."' 142 Judge Layton
apparently reached this conclusion by what may have been a misreading of the court of appeals' holding in Natta v. du Pont.143 Convinced
that the court of appeals disapproved the distinction between ex parte
and inter parte proceedings before the Patent Office, this second In re
Natta stated that "documentary material relating both to ex parte applications for a patent, as well as patent interference proceedings, [are]
144
subject to a claim of privilege."'
While this reading of Natta v. du Pont appears to be an unduly
broad interpretation of the law in the Third Circuit, the court nevertheless caveated its holding with the statement that "even if the Circuit
Court's opinion did contain dictum, it left little doubt as to what the
law should be."' 145 Although it is believed that the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals had not extended its holding to ex parte proceedings, it has
been held, at least in the District of Delaware, that ex parte prosecution
146
papers may be protected.
Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. GAF Corp. 47 involved correspondence between members of an investigative group set up to study possible conflicts with plaintiff's patent rights and a patent attorney and
agent employed by him, both of whom were consulted by Ruberoid as
to these potential patent problems. It was held that communications
between a patent agent and his client may fall within the purview of
the attorney-client privilege when the patent agent is under the direct
391 (footnote omitted).
188 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
189 410 F.2d at 192, 161 U.S.P.Q. at 393.
140 48 F.R.D. 319, 163 U.S.P.Q. 680 (D. Del. 1969).
141 See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
142 48 F.R.D. at 321, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 681 (emphasis added).
148 See notes 45 and 135 supra and accompanying text.
144 48 F.R.D. at 321, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 681 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 321 n.5, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 681.
146 id. at 321, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 681.
147 49 F.R.D. 82, 164 U.S.P.Q. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
137 Id. at 190-91, 161 U.S.P.Q. at
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supervision of an attorney. 148 The court also addressed itself to the
question of whether the members of the investigative group who received the communications from the patent attorneys and their agents,
fell within the "control group" of the corporation and applied the "control group test" established in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
149

Electric Corp.:

[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank
he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial
part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member
of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is
(or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
lawyer and the privilege would apply. In all other cases the employee would be merely giving information to the lawyer to enable
the latter to advise those in the corporation having the authority
to act or refrain from acting on the advice. 150
Thus, it follows that the degree of control exercised by the employee of the corporation who transmitted or received a communication
is preeminent under the control group test in determining whether or
not a communication falls within the attorney-client privilege. The
court in Congoleum determined that several of the members of the
study group were present only in an advisory capacity and exercised
no final judgment relating to any possible conclusion or solution. Therefore, as to communications between those individuals and the patent
attorney and his agent, the attorney-client privilege was held not to be
applicable. 1 1
However, the court failed to consider whether the study group, as
a whole, had the power to render a decision and, therefore, apparently
misinterpreted the test by applying it to each individual of the study
group. Further, it appears as if the court's rationale is in conflict with
the control group test as modified in Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v.
Decker. 5 2 The modified control group test now includes any employee
who
makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the
corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's
advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communi148

Id. at 84, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 377.

149 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
150 Id. at 485.

151 49 F.R.D. at 85, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 378.
152 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afl'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 348, rehearing denied, 401
U.S. 950 (1971).
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cation is the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment. 15
Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.54 reiterated the rule that
where
a corporation is concerned, only communications between counsel
and the corporation's 'control group,' who are in effect the clients,
are within the purview of the privilege. 155
The court stressed that the "[o]ne who claims the benefit of privilege
[has] the burden to demonstrate that the privilege exists" and concluded that the plaintiff in the instant case had not met this burden. 56
In reconciling the broader Harper& Row interpretation of the control
group test, the Honeywell court maintained that even though the privilege had expended beyond the "corporate control group," for the majority of employees, it was difficult to determine whether the communications were part of their duties or were delegated by their superiors. 157
The court also addressed itself to the question of whether an attorney's memorandum concerning a prior terminated interference proceeding fell within the purview of the work product rule in a subsequent
infringement action involving different parties. The court held that the
work product rule did not shield an attorney's memorandum from a
previous case involving different parties, since it was not made with
the present infringement suit in mind. 58 Honeywell has been severely
criticized by patent practitioners on the ground that the prosecution of
a patent application is always carried on with an eye-toward a possible
future infringement suit.
In view of the above, it appears that the Third Circuit has broadly
extended the protection of the immunities to patent attorneys who
were previously not within the purview of the protection.
FOURTH Cutcurr
In the Fourth Circuit, the attorney-client privilege and work product rule were only recently extended to patent matters. Deering Milli-

ken Research Corp. v. Tex-Elastic Corp.,15 9 which involved an infringe15 423 F.2d at 491-92.
154 50 F.R.D. 117, 165 U.S.P.Q. 273 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
155 Id. at 120, 165 U.S.P.Q. at 275.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 120 n.1, 165 U.S.P.Q. at 275.
158 Id. at 119, 165 U.S.P.Q. at 274.
'59 320 F. Supp. 806, 168 U.S.P.Q. 338 (D.S.C. 1970).
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ment suit, relied upon In re Natta6 0o in holding that the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine would be honored in patent
suits.16'
In the recent case of Collins & Aikman Corp. v. J.P. Stevens &
Co.,162 the court denied a motion for the production of documents and
asserted that the "[w]ork product and attorney-client privileges exist in
the field of patent law and must be respected by the court in regulating
discovery." 163 Recognizing the burden that a document-by-document
inspection placed upon the court, the attorney-client privilege and work
product rule were granted without inspection for any document for
which they were invoked. The court stated that it relied heavily upon
the candor of counsel in their representation of the nature of the material for which the privilege was claimed, since most patent actions involving claims of privilege deal with voluminous amounts of documents. 164
FIFTH CIRCUIT

Natta'65

Citing In re
and Natta v. Hogan,166 Shaffer Tool Works
v. Joy Manufacturing Co.167 brought the Fifth Circuit in line with the
modem trend on the subject by asserting that the attorney-client privilege applies in full force in patent matters. The case involved a motion
to vacate deposition notices requesting that various patent examiners
and attorneys be deposed with regard to earlier patent proceedings that
related to the present infringement suit. The court displayed a general
reluctance to allow discovery into the mental processes of government
officials acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, such as a patent examiner.
The inquiry was, therefore, limited to matters of fact relating to the
168
patent prosecutions.
SIXTH CIRCUIT

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied discovery 69 and upheld
the attorney-client privilege in connection with correspondence con160 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.

161 320 F. Supp. at 809, 168 U.S.P.Q. at 340.
162 51 F.R.D. 219, 169 U.S.P.Q. 296 (D.S.C. 1971).
163 Id. at 220, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 297.
184 Id. at 221, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 297.
165 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
166 392 F.2d 686, 157 U.S.P.Q. 183 (10th Cir. 1968). See note 258 inIra and accompanying text.
167 167 U.S.P.Q. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
168 Id. at 170-71.
169 Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1025,

U.SP.Q. 426, 429 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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cerning the preparation of patent applications 170 in Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc. 171 Since outside patent counsel were
involved,72 the court discussed the attorney-client privilege without
facing the more difficult questions relating to house patent attorneys.
In reviewing prior cases, the court distinguished Zenith on the basis
that no corporate patent attorneys were involved 73 and American Cyanamid on the basis that the information sought was not based on facts
available from a public record. 74 However, the court would not accept
the distinction between house and outside counsel which was enunciated in Paper Converting Machine Co. v. FMC Corp.,175 where, in a
similar fact situation, house counsel were adjudged not to be attorneys
for purposes of the privilege. Rather, the Chore-Time court relied on
the United Shoe proposition*that both house and outside counsel could
claim the attorney-client privilege for communications involving legal
advice. 76 The rationale for this holding was found in Ellis-Foster Co.
v. Union Carbide& Carbon Corp.,7 7 which held that patent attorneys
should not be completely denied the attorney-client privilege simply
because they were engaged in the field of patents. 178 Since outside patent
counsel were involved, the case was disposed of without reaching the
more difficult problems. But there appeared, nevertheless, to be a particular awareness on the part of the court of the problems that are
peculiar to this area of patent law.
SEVENTH

CIRCUIT

The Seventh Circuit has handled much patent litigation and is
generally consistent in its treatment of the difficult questions associated
with the attorney-client privilege and the work product rule as they
pertain to patent matters. In order to determine when the attorneyclient privilege or the work product rule is applicable, the courts have
utilized in camera proceedings in especially close questions where the
communications contain factual as well as legal information. However,
the dearth of legal analysis within the opinions makes it difficult to do
170 Id. at 1020, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 426.
171 255 F. Supp. 1020, 150 U.S.P.Q. 426 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
172 Id. at 1021, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 427.
178 Id. at 1021-22, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 427.
174 Id. at 1022, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 427.
175 215 F. Supp. 249, 136 U.S.P.Q. 549 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
176 255 F. Supp. at 1022, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 428.
177 159 F. Supp. 917, 116 U.S.P.Q. 576 (D.N.J. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 284 F.2d
917, 127 U.S.P.Q. 297 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (1961).
178 255 F. Supp. at 1021, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 428.
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anything more than state the holdings and the possible reasons for
them.
In Dura Corp. v. Milwaukee Hydraulic Products Inc.,179 the court
held that it would not inspect the privileged documents once the plaintiff had objected to their discovery and had made a sufficient showing
of their privileged nature to justify its application.1 80 However, this attitude was not always apparent in later cases. Thus, in Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc."" discovery was sought of the original patentee
who had sold his patent rights to one of the litigants. The defendants
contended that the sale constituted a waiver of the privilege. However,
the court dismissed the contention and ordered an in camera inspection. 8 2 In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Solo Cup Co.,18 3 in camera
inspection 84 of certain memoranda between corporate employees and
house patent counsel relating to facts involved in the lawsuit was ordered. In addition, the court, in an attempt to determine whether in
fact such documents were privileged, ordered inspection of the documents which were concerned with patent solicitation.18 5 Following the
reasoning of Natta v. Zletz,

8

6

the court in Beckman Instruments Inc.

v. Technical Development Corp.187 held that in "appropriate circumstances" in camera proceedings were required to determine whether
documents were privileged.18 8 However, the court did not define what
circumstances would necessitate in camera inspection. Illinois Tool
gave no reason for its order, while Continental relied on the Sperry
Rand rationale, but gave no reasons therefore. 8 9
The well-known Seventh Circuit case, Harper & Row, was previously discussed in connection with the analysis of the Third Circuit
law. Harper& Row allowed the attorney-client privilege to be extended
to communications of corporate employees who were not within the
corporate control group, but who communicated information within
the scope of their corporate duties to a corporate attorney. This rule
has been followed in the Seventh Circuit in Illinois Tool Works, Pan179 37 F.R.D. 470, 145 U.S.P.Q. 343 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
180 Id. at 471, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 343
181 50 F.R.D. 382, 164 U.S.P.Q. 499 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
182 Id. at 383-84, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 500.
183 171 U.S.P.Q. 319 (N.D. 11. 1971).
184 Id. at 320.
185 Id.
186
187

418 F.2d 633, 163 U.S.P.Q. 675 (7th Cir. 1969).
172 U.S.P.Q. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1972).

188 Id. at 644.

189 50 F.R.D. at 384, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 500.
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duit Corp. v. Burndy Corp.,19 and in Rockwell Manufacturing Co., v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.1 91
In Illinois Tool Works, it was recognized that correspondence between a corporation and its outside patent counsel concerning the
prosecution of patent applications now falls within the scope of the
attorney-client privilege. 92 Harper& Row was utilized to establish that
the correspondence came within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege. 193 The same test was also employed in Panduit, where the court
held that legal opinions by house patent counsel were protected under
the attorney-client privilege. Even though these opinions were distributed to persons outside the control group, such distribution was held
insufficient to constitute a waiver of the privilege.1 9 4 Subsequently, the
Harper & Row test was utilized in Rockwell. The Rockwell court dealt
with a letter concerning possible patent infringement which was directed to house patent counsel from the corporate director of engineering.195 Although copies were also distributed to a number of other
corporate officers, 196 it was held that the attorney-client privilege
protected them, because intra-corporate dissemination of the information to employees directly concerned with this matter was not sufficient
197
to waive the attorney-client privilege.
While Harper & Row broadened the definition of "client" within
the framework of the corporation, other Seventh Circuit cases broadened the definition of "attorney" in reference to the attorney-client
privilege as it pertains to patent matters. In Dura Corp., correspondence
between outside counsel and house patent counsel that was written
subsequent to the filing of the complaint was found to come within the
purview of the privilege, because the documents involved the litigation
in question. 198 The same reasons were also employed to grant the privilege to communications between outside patent counsel and the corporate counsel. However, the attorney-client privilege was not applied
to communications between outside counsel, because the privilege does
not encompass communications between co-counsel, but rather between
an attorney and his client. 199 But the court obviated the necessity for
190
191
192
193

172 U.S.P.Q. 46 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
176 U.S.P.Q. 21 (N.D. IRl. 1972).
171 US.P.Q. at 320.
Id.
194 172 U.S.P.Q. at 47.
195 176 U.S.P.Q. at 21.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 37 F.R.D. at 472-73, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 344.
199 Id. at 472, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 344.
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disclosure by applying the Hickman work product rule and held that
the documents were protected "in the absence of a strong showing of
good cause" for disclosure. 200 The attorney-client privilege was also extended to the patent drafting phases of patent solicitation in Beckman.
There the court dealt directly with the issue of which aspects of patent
solicitation are discoverable and which are protected by the privilege. It
was recognized that while certain material must necessarily be disclosed
to the Patent Office, 201 other material passing between attorney and
client during the patent drafting and prosecution phases of patent solicitation need not be disclosed to the Patent Office. Therefore, such
material might be protected, 20 2 but it is not clear from the opinion
what constitutes such material.
The Seventh Circuit was also confronted with the question of
whether or not the attorney-client privilege could exist in patent proceedings in view of the public policy of full disclosure in all matters
respecting patents. 20 The court in Natta v. Zletz20 4 responded negatively and extended the attorney-client privilege to correspondence
between house and outside patent counsel, regardless of the legal quali20 5
fications of the house counsel.
With regard to the effect of fraud and unclean hands on the application of the attorney-client privilege and work product rule, the court
in Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc. 206 denied a claim
for both immunities with respect to certain documents on the ground
that the communications were not confidential. After an extended discussion of the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege and
the work product rule, the court concluded that the plaintiff's "unclean
hands" in procuring the reissue patent, with the aid of a retired patent
examiner who had handled the original application, constituted sufficient exceptional circumstances to warrant access to the attorney's work
product.207 Inasmuch as there was no issue of fraud involving outside
counsel the court found no justification for the disclosure of other docuId. at 473, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 344.
172 U.S.P.Q. at 643.
202 Id. at 644. By implication, however, the court would protect those communications
which were not disclosed to the Patent Office and not essentially factual in nature. During
prosecution, as well as prior to filing, matters may be discussed which bear on the legal
issues which have been or may be raised. Such communications may be the type which the
court had in mind.
203 Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, 636, 163 U.S.P.Q. 675, 678 (7th Cir. 1969).
204 418 F.2d 633, 163 U.S.P.Q. 675 (7th Cir. 1969).
205 Id. at 637, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 678.
206 296 F. Supp. 979, 161 U.S.P.Q. 700 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
207 Id. at 982, 161 U.S.P.Q. at 702.
200

201
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ments pertaining to communications with the outside counsel. 20 8 Documents concerning negotiations with prospective licensees were also held
discoverable on the basis that such documents were germane to the
outcome of the infringement misuse and antitrust issues which were
also raised in the case. 20 9 Unfortunately, there is no specific discussion
of the nature of these documents; therefore, it is difficult to evaluate
whether this case is consistent with the other Seventh Circuit cases.
Moreover, the effect of fraud on the attorney-client privilege was also
discussed in Moraine Products, Inc. v. Block Drug Co.,2 1 0 where com211
munications between a corporation and its outside patent counse
were deemed protected under the attorney-client privilege. 2

2

The court

entertained but dismissed the contention that a demonstrated fraud
would defeat the privilege, 21 8 but left the question open for a case in
which there would be sufficient proof of fraud.
In Fastener Corp. v. Spotnails, Inc.,2 1 4 certain portions of patent

prosecution files which were a matter of public record in the Patent
Office were held to be subject to discovery, while those portions of the
files which were not a matter of public record were held to be privileged
under the work product rule. 215 However, the court added a proviso
that the demanding party must prove not only the relevance of the
documents to the litigation, but must also show good cause for their
production in order to avoid wholesale disclosure of an attorney's work
product.218 Soon after Fastener,the work product rule was extended in
Natta v. Zletz to interference papers prepared by both inside and outside patent counsel. 217 However, the court did not extend the protection
to letters from outside consultants, since they did not contain legal advice, but, rather, expert technical advice.218 This type of expert advice
parallels that of other prospective witnesses and exclusion from work
product protection seems questionable. Since the consultant here had
already testified in the interference proceedings, what reasons could
there have been for permitting discovery? The court said that "Standard
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at 983, 161 US.P.Q. at 702-03.
Id.
172 U.S.P.Q. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
Id.
Id.
Id.
43 F.R.D. 204, 155 U.S.P.Q. 209 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
Id. at 207, 155 U.S.P.Q. at 210.
Id. at 206-07, 155 U.S.P.Q. at 210.
418 F.2d at 637-38, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 679.
Id. at 638, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 679.
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should not be able to avail itself of both the testimony of this expert
219
and his secret technical advice."
The remaining issues touched upon by the Seventh Circuit pertained to foreign patent agents and patent counsel not admitted to the
bar where they were employed. Rayette-Faberge, Inc. v. John Oster
Manufacturing Co. 220 concerned communications between a United
States attorney and a foreign patent agent. No attorney-client privilege
was granted, because the agents were not attorneys-at-law. 221 A better
rule would have been to apply the same tests which are applied to other
attorney communications rather than to automatically exclude the patent agent from the purview of the privilege. This latter rationale was
222
applied in the Ninth Circuit in Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co.
The Panduit court also touched peripherally on the problem of
whether a house patent counsel not admitted to the bar of the state of
his employment could claim the benefit of the attorney-client privilege. 228 Relying on Sperry, the court stated that it is now well-settled
that patent attorneys do practice law, and therefore, should be granted
22 4
the attorney-client privilege.
In retrospect, it appears that the Seventh Circuit has substantially
liberalized the Zenith and the United Shoe rulings and is, thus, generally in agreement with the present views of the Third Circuit.
EIGHTH CnRcurr

No reported cases involving the attorney-client privilege or the
work product rule, as they apply to patent practitioners, have been discovered in the Eighth Circuit.
NINTH CIRCUIT

The issue of whether the attorney-client privilege is applicable to
house patent counsel has not yet been squarely raised in the Ninth Circuit. In Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co.,225 the court was concerned
with the discovery of patent applications filed by outside patent counsel.
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

Id.
47 F.R.D. 524, 163 U.S.P.Q. 373 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
Id. at 527, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 374.
54 F.R.D. 44, 172 U.S.P.Q. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
172 U.S.P.Q. at 47.
Id.
54 F.R.D. 44, 172 U.S.P.Q. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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The court upheld the application of the privilege to documents whose
primary purpose was legal guidance or business developments with an
implied request for legal advice, 226 but did not differentiate between
outside and house patent counsel. Privileged communications included
legal advice associated with factual information, requests for legal advice, and documents which were the direct result of attorney-client interaction. 227 The court then defined those documents which it felt were
not protected by the privilege. Among these documents were client
authorizations to file patent applications; papers submitted to the
Patent Office; compendiums of filing fees and requirements in the
United States and foreign countries for various types of applications;
resumes of applications filed and registrations obtained or rejected,
including dates and file or registration numbers; technical information
communicated to the attorney in order to facilitate the completion of
patent applications, but not requiring legal advice; business advice;
communications whose confidentiality was waived; and documents
written or obtained from third parties which were severable from communications seeking legal advice. 228 In addition, the same court had
held in a prior case between these same two parties that communications between an outside patent attorney and his corporate client relating to a third-party agreement did not come within the ambit of the
privilege, because the client's third-party complaint brought the agree229
ment into issue, thereby waiving the privilege.
Although the court was noncommittal concerning the difference
between outside and house patent counsel, it took a very liberal position with regard to foreign patent agents. Contrary to the position taken
by the Seventh Circuit, the Jack Winter court chose to treat the communications between the British agents and a Chicago patent firm as
though they emanated from an attorney-client relationship. 230 Thus,
judgments as to the applicability of the attorney-client privilege were
determined under the same criteria as every other document without
the handicap of a blanket prohibition on all communications involving
foreign agents.
In a prior opinion concerning the same suit,2 1 the issue of whether
the privilege should be extended to papers submitted to the Patent
226
227
228
229

Id. at 46, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 202.
Id. at 48, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 203.
Id. at 47, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 202.
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 229, 166 U.S.P.Q. 295, 298 (N.D.

Cal. 1970).
280
281

54 F.R.D. at 48, 172 U.S.P.Q. at 203.
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 50 F.R.D. 225, 166 U.S.P.Q. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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Office was decided. After emphatically stating that an attorney has no
discretion as to what part of the factual information concerning patent
applications should be revealed to the Patent Office, the court held that
papers associated with patent solicitation which were never submitted
82
to the Patent Office fell within the purview of the privilege. 2
The court also considered the issue of fraud, but summarily dismissed it for lack of proof. The court, nevertheless, stated that a prima
facie showing of fraud would vitiate the effect of the privilege. 288
Garrisonv. General Motors Corp.23 4 was decided before the United
States Supreme Court decision in Sperry. Nevertheless, substantial differences were noted between the earlier Florida supreme court decision
in Sperry and the earlier cases of Zenith and American Cyanamid,
which were concerned with whether a patent attorney's work constituted the practice of law. The court recognized that it was not bound
by these decisions, but still concluded that patent attorneys do indeed
practice law when acting in the capacity of legal advisors and engaging
235
primarily in legal activities.
Garrisoncame down shortly after the City of Philadelphiacase in
which the control group test was formulated. The City of Philadelphia
case was, thus, an aid to the Garrison court, which was squarely faced
with the problem of how the attorney-client privilege relates to corporate employees, corporate officers, and in-house patent attorneys. The
court concluded that officers, directors, and department heads of the
corporation were members of the control group and, therefore, fell
within the purview of the privilege. 2 6 Moreover, attorneys in the corporate patent department were equated with general house counsel,
who as attorneys-at-law were protected by the privilege. Thus, by inference, in-house patent counsel were held to be comparable to outside
287
patent counsel to whom the privilege had been extended in Zenith.
The court, nevertheless, considered the control group test as being a
limitation on the application of the attorney-client privilege to corpo238
rate patent attorneys.
Inasmuch as Garrison is the only Ninth Circuit case which dealt
with this area of the law, it represents a relatively advanced position for
the period in which it was decided. In view of more recent cases in other
232
238
284
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237
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Id. at 228-29, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 298.
Id. at 229, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 298.
213 F. Supp. 515, 136 U.S.P.Q. 343 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
Id. at 519-20, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 346-47.
Id. at 517-19, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 345-46.
Id. at 520-21, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 347.
Id. at 520, 136 U.S.P.Q. at 346.
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circuits, it is probable that the same result would be reached today, although the control group test has since been modified in the Harper
"Row case.
TENTH CIRCUIT

Realizing that generalized tests were not sufficient to determine
23 9
which documents should be protected, the court in Hogan v. Zletz
found it necessary to examine the documents one by one for earmarks
which would indicate whether they were protected under the attorneyclient privilege. 240 Although it rejected arguments that the broad public
interest of full disclosure in patent matters vitiated the privilege, the
court followed Zenith by holding that documents originating in cor241
porate patent departments are ordinarily not covered by the privilege.
As a result, the court ruled that the group of documents produced in
defendant's corporate patent department must be produced for in
camera inspection. Upon examination, the documents were deemed not
to be protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product
rule, not because of the nature of the attorney's work, but rather because the documents were addressed to the corporate patent department
in general and were not prepared with an eye-toward any possible liti242
gation.
The court then proceeded to define the various persons who fell
within the purview of the statute. Communications among house patent
counsel were held not protected by the attorney-client privilege, because the communications were between attorneys, rather than between
an attorney and his client.243 However, the communications between
a house patent counsel and the manager and the assistant manager of the
corporate research and development department were considered protected ufider the attorney-client privilege when they contained legal
239 43 F.R.D. 308, 154 U.S.P.Q. 230 (N.D. Okla. 1967).
240 Id. at 313-14, 154 U.S.P.Q. at 233.

241 Id. at 315, 154 U.S.P.Q. at 234. See Natta v. Hogan, 592 F.2d 686, 157 U.S.P.Q. 183
(10th Cir. 1968) where the court stated:
The attorney-client privilege is designed "to facilitate the administration of justice," in order "to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients."
We see no reason why this long-established principle should not be applied to
patent cases. The public interest is in the development of the truth, both in patent proceedings and in ordinary litigation. The duty of full disclosure differs
from the freedom of consultation with lawyers.
Id. at 693, 157 U.S.P.Q. at 187 (footnotes omitted) (quoting from Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322, 318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963)).
242 43 F.R.D. at 317, 154 U.S.P.Q. at 236.
248 Id. at 315, 154 U.S.P.Q. at 234.

COMMENTS

1973]

advice. 244 But the privilege was not extended to the communications
of employees at lower levels of responsibility in the corporation, since
they were not deemed to be part of the control group whose responsibil245
ity was to pursue policy on the basis of the legal advice given.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that there
is no automatic waiver "of the attorney-client privilege in patent cases
where a client gives his attorney information with which to prepare
patent papers. The court also affirmed the application of the control
group test to the various documents sought to be discovered. 246 In ap-

plying the test, the court rejected Natta's allegation that certain of the
communications in issue were not privileged, because they were communications from an attorney to a control group, rather than from the
control group to the attorney. Citing Wigmore, the court stated that it
would not accept this argument, because the protection of such communication was necessary in order to prevent the attorney's statements from
becoming those of his client.2

47

This reasoning is in line with the

United States Court of Claims' decision in General Electric Co. v.
United States, where the court employed a similar rationale. 248
With respect to the work product rule, the court asserted that the
rule as enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor is not limited to the preparation of papers for proceedings in a court of record and granted protection to documents which contained the mental processes of an attorney.
An attorney's work in the patent law field should be as much his
own as it is in other areas of the law. The work product claim cantheory that the documents were not
not be brushed aside on the 249
prepared for use in litigation.
DIsTucT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

In Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 250 the

court granted a motion for discovery solely on the basis of statements
in previous cases, primarily Zenith, to the effect that no attorney-client
privilege attached to activities involving the preparation and prosecution of patent applications. 251 Inasmuch as there is no reference to any
at 315-16, 154 U.S.P.Q. at 234.
Id. at 314, 316-17, 154 U.S.P.Q. at 233, 235-36.
Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692, 157 U.S.P.Q. 183, 188 (10th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 692-93, 157 U.S.P.Q. at 188.
176 US.P.Q. 83, 85 (Ct. C1. 1972).
392 F.2d at 693, 157 U.S.P.Q. at 189.
314 F. Supp. 546, 165 U.S.P.Q. 97 (D.D.C. 1970).
Id. at 548, 165 U.S.P.Q. at 97-98.

244 Id.
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247
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modem cases expressing the opposing viewpoint, it must be concluded
that either the judge ignored or the plaintiff's counsel failed to discern
the current trends which have occurred in this area of the law. Interestingly, plaintiff's counsel in the case inadvertently submitted for examination a communication that probably would have been granted the
benefit of the attorney-client privilege under the rationale of the more
25 2
liberal recent cases dealing with the subject.
THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF CLAIMS

In Ledex, Inc. v. United States,253 the defendant, in attempting to
obtain discovery of certain documents, relied principally upon the recent UnderwaterStorage case, which generally expressed the older viewpoints relating to the attorney-client privilege. After reviewing the more
recent cases, the court recognized that, subsequent to Sperry, patent
solicitation had definitely been considered to constitute the practice of
law. 254 The court, therefore, concluded that in camera inspection of the

documents was necessary in order to determine whether they were protected. As to a claim under the work product rule, the court stated that
the documents could not be protected, since they were not generated
255
in preparation for litigation.
The principles established by this case would apparently allow a
court to grant protection under the attorney-client privilege for documents generated during patent prosecution, whenever the technical
matters involved are intermixed with legal questions. However, it appears that the court would not extend the privilege to communications
between a patent attorney and a foreign agent, because the latter is not
256
an attorney-at-law.
The court was faced with a rather unusual situation in General
Electric Co. v. United States,25 7 for the documents in question were
communications from attorneys in government agencies to the Justice
Department. Plaintiff asserted numerous arguments against granting
the attorney-client and the work product privileges, including the usual
reasons that the documents were not made with an eye toward litigation
and that there was no attorney-client relationship. However, the court
disagreed with the majority of plaintiff's assertions stating that the agen252 Id. at 548-49, 165 U.S.P.Q. at 98.

172 U.S.P.Q. 538 (Ct. C1. 1972).
254 Id. at 539-40.
255 Id. at 539, 541.
256 Id. at 540.
257 176 U.S.P.Q. 83 (Ct. CL 1972).
253
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cies acted as the client of the Department of Justice, which was pursuing evidence for the defense of the litigation. The case is analogous to
the Tenth Circuit decision in Natta v. Hogan25s since the court felt that
it made no real difference whether the information passed from the at259
torney to the client or vice versa.
Plaintiff also contended that the confidentiality of the communications was violated by their passage among various agency hands. The
court, nevertheless, upheld their protectability, stating that such an interpretation would cut the heart from the attorney-client privilege for
260
large organizations.
The very size of such organizations dictates that internal communications be passed through the hands of several persons before reaching their ultimate destination. To unreasonably demand that only
a few people be allowed access to such communications would
effectively eliminate the attorney-client privilege. 261
The court's approach in this case appears to represent the most modem
thinking in this area of the law, because it required each of the documents to be produced for an in camera inspection in order to determine
on an individual basis if either the work product rule or the attorneyclient privilege was available to protect the documents.
CONCLUSION

On the basis of the above analysis, it appears clear that the courts
have, in general, moved away from the broad generalizations expressed
in United Shoe and Zenith, which had, for a period of time, prevented
the corporate patent attorney from invoking either the attorney-client
privilege and/or the work product rule. In their place, there has generally developed the far more flexible approach of ascertaining the applicability of these immunities in any given situation by analyzing the
specific activity or document in question without regard to the particular specialization of the attorney.
Several important problems in this area still remain unsettled, however, and the following recommendations, hopefully consistent with the
fundamental principles upon which the attorney-client privilege and
work product rule rest, are offered as rational solutions:
First, neither patent agents nor patent attorneys acting within the
258 392 F.2d at 692-93, 157 U.S.P.Q. at 188.
259 176 U.s.P.Q. at 85.
260 Id. at 86.
261 Id.
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scope of their specialty should be disqualified, per se, from invoking
either the attorney-client or work product immunities when they otherwise comply with the requirements, notwithstanding the fact that they
are members of a corporate patent department. The distinction developed by some courts between the in-house patent counsel and the general legal counsel, both outside and in-house, is artificial and illusory
at best, serving no real determinative function other than to engender
much confusion in an already confused area of law. A far more relevant
criterion for determining whether a patent agent or patent attorney
should be protected by the attorney-client privilege is whether the agent
or attorney was acting as a lawyer, that is, giving legal advice or applying legal knowledge to confidential facts supplied to him by his client.
Similarly, with respect to the work product rule, the criterion should
be whether the documents were prepared in contemplation of a possible
litigation and whether the subject matter of the documents constitutes
the application of legal principles to factual matters. This recommendation is a natural consequence of the Sperry ruling, which held that
a patent agent's, and, therefore, a patent attorney's activities constitute
the practice of law.
Second, ex parte prosecution papers transmitted to the Patent Office
in the orderly prosecution of a patent application and otherwise qualifying under the attorney-client and work product immunities should
not be discoverable, provided that the contents of the application to
which they relate have not been made publicly available, such as where
the application has been abandoned. Since such papers are kept in
secrecy until the patent is granted, the immunities cannot be waived
by the mere transmission of these papers to the Patent Office. Privileged
status for other papers associated with the prosecution should depend
upon whether they involve legal advice or are exclusively factual in
nature.
Third, validity, patentability, and infringement opinions should
qualify under the attorney-client and work product immunities, even
though they are prepared in the absence of imminent or pending litigation. The fact that such opinions are based in part upon publicly
available documents detracts from neither the confidentiality nor the
basically legal nature of the opinions.
Fourth, the expansion of the control group test in Harper & Row
constitutes a more rational approach toward defining the "corporate
client." The degree of control exercised by a corporate employee to
whom a communication is made is not a valid consideration, because
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confidential communications pertinent to patents will of necessity often
involve employees at lower levels in the corporate structure.
Fifth, and finally, confidential communications between foreign
patent agents and United States patent attorneys or agents should be
protected under both the work product and attorney-client privileges
where the circumstances otherwise warrant it. The world-wide scope of
the patent solicitation and litigation activities of today's multi-national
corporations makes any other approach provincial and unrealistic. So
long as foreign patent agents meet the qualifications for patent practice
in their local countries, they should at least be treated on a par with
United States patent agents.
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